Abstract:
Gaming models of reciprocal insurance is considered. In the gaming profile there is a choice of a player to take part or not to take part in reciprocal insurance funding. Behavior of a player depends upon her risk aversion. Through the scalar parameter of risk aversion partition function is defined. This partition function results in threshold behavior of the players. Anonymous and non-anonymous gambling models are considered. For both models the conditions of Nash equilibrium are found.
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